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Executive Summary
We conduct a longitudinal analysis of the NACUBO-
Commonfund Study of Endowments (NCSE) results 
from 2006-2013 to evaluate if active management is 
related to higher endowment returns in U.S. equities 
over time. We also analyze the data to evaluate the 
endowment characteristics that are related to higher 
levels of performance over time. 
We find that active management for endowments is 
significantly positively related to higher returns net of 
fees from U.S. equity allocations over the evaluation 
period. In addition, endowments with CIOs or OCIOs 
are better able to earn incremental positive returns 
from active management than those without. Larger 
endowments are better able to earn incremental positive 
returns from active management than the smallest 
endowments but the effect appears to diminish as 
endowments increase in size.
Section I
Introduction
Beginning with Sharpe (1966) and Jensen (1968), many 
have questioned the relative value of passive versus active 
management and have argued that after fees, indexed 
portfolios are superior investment vehicles. French 
(2008) among others has argued that investors spend a 
significant amount on fees, expenses and trading costs, 
in actively managed funds that on average fail to beat 
market indices after those costs are considered. 
Active management is broad and portfolio managers 
may use a variety of factors and strategies to construct 
their portfolio(s)1. These include quantitative measures 
such as Price–Earnings ratios and Price Earnings to 
Growth ratios, sector investments that attempt to 
anticipate long-term macroeconomic trends (such as 
a focus on energy or housing stocks), and purchasing 
stocks of companies that are temporarily out-of-favor 
or selling at a discount to their intrinsic value. Some 
actively managed funds also pursue strategies such as 
risk arbitrage, short sales, and option writing.
1 Active managers rely on analytical research, forecasts, and their 
own judgment and experience in making investment decisions on 
what securities to buy, hold and sell. The opposite of active manage-
ment is called passive management, better known as “indexing”. 
The active manager will deviate from the benchmark weights by (i) 
varying the weights from the benchmark weights on securities in the 
benchmark; (ii) adding securities outside the benchmark or choosing 
not to hold securities included in the benchmark and (iii) time-
varying asset allocation where weights on certain securities change 
through time. The goal of active management is to produce a return 
that exceeds the passive return with minimal risk.
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The effectiveness of an actively managed investment 
portfolio obviously depends on the skill of the manager 
and research staff but also on how truly active they are. 
Many mutual funds that purport to be actively managed 
stay fully invested regardless of market conditions, with 
only minor allocation adjustments over time. In reality, 
a large percentage of "actively managed" funds rarely 
outperform their index counterparts over an extended 
period of time because many mutual funds are “closet 
indexers” (i.e. funds whose portfolios look like indexes 
and whose performance is very closely correlated to an 
index). Alernative managers will retreat fully to cash, or 
use hedging strategies during prolonged market declines. 
These two groups of active managers will often have very 
different performance characteristics.2
The choice for long term equity investors to manage 
investments actively or passively has important 
implications on their potential outperformance. On 
the one hand, Wermers (2000) summarized the state 
of U.S. equity fund research as follows: “The majority 
of studies now conclude that actively managed funds 
underperform their passively managed counterparts.” 
The dominant view is that active management does not 
pay, even for sophisticated investors, and is costly on 
net. Furthermore, opportunities for active managers 
to outperform passive indices are thought to be lower 
in more efficient markets. The U.S. equity market is 
considered to be one of the most efficient markets. 
Consequently, academics have advised investors to avoid 
active U.S. equity management. 
On the other hand, certain active managers consistently 
beat the passive index net of fees. Cremers and Petajisto 
2 High tracking error volatility is one way to evaluate the degree of 
active management.  The logic behind the measurement is that the 
makeup of the individual stocks in the portfolio will be reflected in 
the pattern of the returns. If the returns of the portfolio deviate from 
the index returns significantly through time, the makeup of the port-
folio must be significantly different from the index. While tracking 
error volatility makes sense and is easy to calculate, it only infers what 
the manager is doing in the portfolio and does not actually look at 
the underlying holdings. Active Share is found by analyzing the actual 
holdings of a manager’s portfolio and comparing those holdings to 
its benchmark index. By measuring active management in this way, 
investors can get a clearer understanding of what exactly a manager 
is doing to drive performance, rather than drawing conclusions from 
observed returns. Active Share is calculated by taking the sum of the 
absolute value of the differences of the weight of each holding in the 
manager’s portfolio versus the weight of each holding in the bench-
mark index and dividing by two.
(2009) show that among active managers, those whose 
holdings most significantly differ from their index 
benchmarks (i.e. truly active as opposed to closet 
indexers) tend to outperform their benchmarks net of 
fees over time.
As Sharpe (1991) and French (2008) point out, it is 
impossible for all active investors to outperform. A 
necessary condition for active management to deliver 
excess returns is that those investors who choose it as 
an investment strategy must be sophisticated enough in 
their abilities to select and retain the better-performing 
managers.  
The economics of investment management suggest that 
institutional investors should be more likely to have the 
ability to better select outperforming active managers. 
They are large and sophisticated repeat contractors 
with external managers, which gives them both more 
potential to provide oversight (see, for example, Del 
Guercio and Tkac (2002)) and more negotiating power, 
leading to lower costs and a greater share of any rents in 
the relationship (Dyck and Pomorski (2011)). Successful 
active investors must be able to identify the best 
active managers. Jones and Wermers (2011) found the 
following investment capabilities necessary when seeking 
to identify and evaluate superior active managers: 
•	 The ability to conduct performance attribution 
of past performance (properly adjusted) to help 
identify sources of returns and historical active 
share in different market environments.
•	 The ability to analyze manager investment style 
and factor characteristics
•	 The ability to estimate managers’ opportunity sets 
in different economic environments. Opportunity 
set is linked to expected returns by manager in 
that certain economic environments are more 
favorable to individual active management 
strategies and to a given manager’s skill. This 
insight informs tactical allocations to active and 
passive strategies and ultimately to manager 
allocations. 
•	 Ongoing analysis of active manager fund holdings 
to detect style drift or closet indexing
Institutional investors are more likely to invest in these 
skills and capabilities in an effort to identify and profit 
over the long term from allocating to superior active 
managers. In fact, according to the Yale endowment’s 
most recent report, “For the twenty years ending June 
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30, 2012, nearly 80 percent of Yale’s outperformance 
relative to the average Cambridge Associates endowment 
was attributable to the value added by Yale’s active 
managers, while only 20 percent was the result of Yale’s 
asset allocation.”3
Risk Tolerance of Endowments Makes Active  
Management Attractive
Endowments are a specific type of long term, 
sophisticated institutional investor. They are perpetual 
investors for the benefit of future generations. Their 
distinct objectives and risk tolerances make them 
uniquely capable of capturing the long term benefits of 
active management.
Unlike pensions4, endowments typically have a different 
reason for being and different objectives for their 
investing that inspires them a greater ability to pursue 
active management. With an obligation to preserve or 
grow real assets for future generations, endowments are 
inter-generational investors. In addition, they exist to 
provide reliable income for current operating and grant 
budgets of the institutions they support. Endowments 
are also unique in that they typically have relatively 
small “liabilities” to fund as a percentage of assets. These 
liabilities are to an extent variable over short periods 
of time (and in many cases relate to the endowment’s 
investment performance via its spending rule). These 
liabilities are however, infinite given the perpetual nature 
of endowments.  The perpetual nature of endowments 
3 2012 The Yale Endowment,  Yale University, Pg. 7
4 Other types of long term, sophisticated institutional investors 
such as retirement or pension funds exist and invest to meet measur-
able, fixed, and finite liabilities. Typically, these liabilities are relatively 
large compared to the assets invested. The maturity and size of these 
liabilities is to a large extent controllable at the time of underwrit-
ing. The ongoing assessment of the certainty of the invested assets’ 
ability to fund these liabilities when due, determines the risk taking 
ability of the entity. The relationship between the expected future 
value of the assets and the expected future value of liabilities and the 
certainty around those measures, determines the risk taking capacity 
of these investors. This relationship is expressed by the funding ratio.
The funding ratio is the ratio of assets to liabilities. Funding ratios 
above a one indicate the pension can cover all obligated payments. 
Ratios below one will reflect it is unable to make payments or may 
be in jeopardy of not being about to make payments at a later time.  
The funding ratio of a pension will be much smaller than that of an 
endowment. Liabilities of pensions are also less flexible and payable 
on average sooner than an endowment’s. Pension funds are only 
perpetual investors to the extent that they are serial investors for each 
generation of retirees that they underwrite and who contribute capital 
to their own future pension. In this sense, they are intra-generational 
investors.
implies that the primary area of uncertainty is the 
difference between the expected rate of return of the 
endowment and the expected rate of inflation over the 
long term. Consequently, return targets are often set to 
beat real global growth, forever. 
Downside volatility is not a major risk except where it 
coincides with a period where high levels of liquidity are 
needed. In a circumstance where a significant portion 
of the endowment needs to be liquidated to deliver 
cash to fund the institution AND markets have fallen 
significantly, then negative real returns may be realized. 
The impact of such an event on the long term returns of 
the endowment should be relatively small as near term 
liabilities are a small percentage of endowment assets. 
The fact that near term liabilities are typically a small 
percentage of current assets implies that intermittent 
drawdowns in the market value of the endowment due 
to a short period of volatility should not materially 
impact the long term goal of outperforming inflation as 
long as expected returns remain intact. 
While active managers may produce more volatile 
returns depending on the rate of return from active 
management, the higher volatility need not lead to 
lower terminal wealth expectations. Jones and Wermers 
(2011) found that long term investors with at least a 20 
year horizon who are able to identify superior active 
managers with an aggregate expected information 
ratio of 0.25 and no correlation with other risks in the 
investor’s portfolio, can theoretically expect a 32% 
increase in terminal wealth and an 10.7% increase in 
expected volatility by increasing active risk taking by 
only 6%. In short, endowments have a capacity for 
volatility and liquidity risk.
Characteristics of Active Equity Managers
Active managers have risk characteristics that match well 
with endowment risk appetite. These risks are typically 
slightly higher volatility, somewhat lower liquidity, and 
higher portfolio concentration than passive managers.   
Kosowski (2006) found that active equity managers 
outperform in periods of high volatility and stock 
dispersion. With respect to liquidity, Huang, Sialm, 
and Zhang (2010) hypothesized that active managers 
who have superior information or analytical capabilities 
are likely to profit from supplying liquidity in times of 
market stress.  Wei, Wermers, and Yao (2009) found 
that Contrarian activist managers outperformed passive 
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herding managers by more than 260 bps a year. Their 
findings suggest that these excess returns come both 
from supplying liquidity to the market and from 
superior information collection and analysis. Investors 
with a long investment horizon, and little need for 
liquidity of their own, will be well positioned to benefit 
as providers of liquidity. 
Concentration is also a characteristic of active managers. 
Cremers and Petajisto (2009) found that managers who 
take big active positions perform better than those who 
take small positions. They defined “active share” as 
the absolute difference between a stock’s weight in the 
portfolio and its weight in the “best fit” benchmark, 
cumulated across all the stocks in the portfolio and the 
benchmark. They found that funds with the highest 
aggregate active share outperform those with the 
lowest active share by roughly 250 bps a year. They 
attributed this result to greater “conviction” on the part 
of active managers and concluded that “the most active 
stock pickers have enough skill to outperform their 
benchmarks even after fees and transaction costs.”
Due to their perpetual investment horizon and the 
relationship between the size of their assets and near 
term liabilities, endowments tend to have high tolerances 
for volatility and liquidity risks that can make active 
management attractive. We argue that 1) endowments 
have a significant ability to accept the volatility and 
liquidity risks which active management brings and 
2) their broad diversification to systemic factors and 
alpha5 from active management results in higher 
long term returns due to greater amounts of principal 
compounding at higher rates over time. Active equity 
management is one means by which endowments can 
use their appetite for volatility and liquidity risk to 
enhance returns. 
The evaluation of whether endowments’ active equity 
investments underperform, are not different from, or 
outperform their passive investments in U.S. markets 
requires knowing the returns earned and costs incurred 
by endowments pursuing both active and passive 
management strategies. This granular data is not 
readily available. However, one straightforward way 
to overcome these obstacles is to simply ask a broad 
sample of endowment managers about the realized cost, 
allocation and performance of their actual active and 
5 Returns lowly correlated to systemic factors.
passive positions.
In this paper, we take advantage of this type of 
survey data collected by the National Association of 
College and University Business Officers (NACUBO) 
and Commonfund Institute. Endowments report 
to NACUBO–Commonfund so that their boards 
and management will be able to compare their costs 
and return performance with that of their peers. The 
NACUBO–Commonfund Study of Endowments 
(NCSE) data includes a significant portion of the 
endowment population. Our analysis of the NCSE 
data confirms that endowments are significant users of 
active management and that usage increases with size. 
Over 75% of endowments in the survey reported that 
50% or more of their U.S. equity allocation was actively 
managed. 
FIGURE I
NCSE Respondents Utilizing Active Management
(2006-2013)
Source: NACUBO-Commonfund Study of Endowments (NCSE)
So, given their risk appetite and resources, we test 
empirically whether endowments that reportedly pursue 
active management report higher net returns. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. 
In the next section, we describe the role of the CIO in 
endowment management and their impact on returns. 
In section III, we describe our data set. In section 
IV, we describe our methodology and we analyze the 
contribution of active management to endowment 
returns. In section V, we conclude.
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Section II
Role of Endowment CIO and OCIO 
The Chief Investment Officer (CIO) of an Endowment 
manages the endowment assets of an institution and 
their ability to fund future obligations while balancing 
expected returns and risks. Often working with 
oversight by an Investment Committee, the Chief 
Investment Officer’s goal is to sustain spending from 
the endowment in support of the institution’s academic 
programs for future generations.
The job requires significant investment expertise, a 
deep understanding of the investment skills required to 
manage the endowment compared to those present in 
the organization and those outsourced to third parties6, 
day to day management skill to lead the investment 
organization, the ability to nurture the skills of staff, 
the ability to prioritize often competing requirements 
of the institution, and the ability to stay up-to-date on 
regulatory developments. Within this larger mandate, 
a CIO is tasked with understanding current and future 
needs and goals of the organization, setting realistic 
return expectations given forecasts of future returns, and 
setting a risk tolerance that balances the organization’s 
investment needs. The risk tolerance and return 
expectations are typically set out in the policy portfolio. 
The outflow and inflow expectations are typically set out 
in the capital raising expectations and spending policies. 
Together, these policies help the organization meet its 
obligations within the confines of its risk tolerance. 
After determining the policy portfolio, executing the 
investment plan and deciding the degree of active or 
passive investment strategies to utilize is an endowment 
CIO’s second most important strategic decision.  To 
make this active versus passive decision, the CIO must 
have conviction as to the opportunity the market 
6 Hiring a CIO or an investment team can represent a significant 
financial commitment for an institution, especially for an endowment 
with a small to mid-size asset pool. Additionally, smaller organizations 
may be able to hire only one professional who, however knowledge-
able, may lack the time or expertise to do every task related to the 
job well. Rather than relying on a small CIO office or an investment 
committee, CIO outsourcing provides immediate, turnkey access to 
asset allocation expertise to assist in policy portfolio design, extensive 
manager research and selection expertise, and ongoing monitoring 
of the investment portfolio.  Outsourced CIOs can take responsibil-
ity for navigating the array of available investment options including 
active, passive and tactical investment strategies, products that use 
derivatives and leverage, and those with lockups and alternate fee 
structures.
Key CIO Responsibilities: 
Develop investment guidelines and strategic objectives, 
including asset allocation policies, manager selection 
criteria, and risk management framework.
Determine the risk appetite; where to take risk; evaluating 
active and passive investment opportunities by asset 
class; selecting active managers.  
Review and monitor portfolio risk characteristics and 
compliance with investment guidelines.
Monitor asset allocation and implement re-balancing 
actions in accordance with the investment policy and 
Investment Committee approval.
Manage the investment research and reporting process, 
including the production of comprehensive due diligence 
reports for existing and prospective investment managers.
Identify, evaluate and recommend new investment 
opportunities through proactive outreach, creative 
thinking, and careful consideration of capital market trends 
and conditions.
Monitor, analyze, and present the ongoing performance 
of all investment managers and related capital market 
segments 
Prepare the annual investment/endowment operating 
budget and update investment income projections as 
appropriate.
Maintain an excellent reputation for the University 
throughout the finance and investment community.
Proactively communicate the investment objectives and 
progress with internal and external constituent groups. 
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provides at a given point in time for active management 
to produce returns in excess of fees and costs. The CIO 
must have an economic outlook, performance analysis 
data of how active managers have done in different 
economic environments, and the ability to complete 
the due diligence and to invest with the most desired 
active managers in short order. In almost all economic 
endeavors, the quality of management is generally a key 
component of a successful operation but the extent to 
which a quality fund manager can exceed an index or 
his or her peers depends on the efficiency of the market. 
Consequently, a CIOs’ convictions about active versus 
passive management may vary by asset class and over 
time. Furthermore, they may vary by manager within 
an asset class depending on the CIO's assessment of the 
manager’s skill.
So, given their responsibilities, skills, and resources, 
do CIOs make better decisions and realize higher 
returns with respect to active management? We also 
test empirically whether endowments that retain a 
CIO or OCIOs report higher net returns from active 
management. 
Section III
Description of Data and Methodology Used 
We evaluate the NACUBO—Commonfund Study of 
Endowments (NCSE) Dataset 2006 – 2013. The annual 
NCSE analyzes return data net of fees and a wide range 
of related information gathered from a broad cross 
section of U.S. colleges and universities, both public and 
private, as well as their supporting endowments. The size 
and scope of the study make it the most comprehensive 
annual report on the investment management and 
governance practices and policies of U.S. institutions of 
higher education. Eight hundred thirty-five institutions 
participated in the 2013 NCSE of which 533 were private 
and 302 were public. The participating institutions in the 
2013 survey represent $448.6 billion in total endowment 
assets. Ninety-four percent of the 2013 year’s participating 
institutions also participated in the prior year’s study.
Limitations of the data
The results are self-reported. It is not possible to verify 
the accuracy of each individual’s response. Persistence 
of respondents across time is strong but not 100 
percent. Sufficient time series data on the degree of 
active management utilized in U.S. Equities is directly 
observable from the data. Data on the degree of active 
management in other asset classes is being accumulated 
but is not yet of sufficient duration to be meaningfully 
analyzed.  
Methodology
Starting from fiscal year 2006, the NCSE includes 
questions on actively and passively managed allocations 
for domestic equity investments of the endowment. 
Additionally, the survey asks questions on overall return 
of the endowment for domestic equity investments along 
with other asset classes. This data allows us to analyze 
returns of the endowment relative to its activeness within 
the domestic equity asset class.
We grouped respondents into 25 activeness buckets based 
on their relative allocation of active investments in the 
domestic equity market.  Specifically, we define activeness 
of the endowment as a percentage ratio of the active 
portion of domestic equity allocation to the total domestic 
equity allocation. Activeness buckets were distributed as 
follows:   0-4%, 4-8%, 8-12% . . . 92-96%, 96-100%. 
For example endowments in 4-8% activeness bucket 
have 4-8% of their domestic equity allocation to actively 
managed funds and 92-96% in passive index equity 
funds.  Figure II below shows the distribution of NCSE 
respondents’ reported use of active management within 
their domestic equity allocations. 50% of respondents 
report for example that 100% of their U.S. equity 
allocation is actively managed. This is by far the dominant 
mode of U.S. Equity management among endowments. 
FIGURE II
Distribution of NCSE Respondents Utilizing Active 
Management
2006-2013
Source: NACUBO-Commonfund Study of Endowments (NCSE)
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Section IV
Hypothesis Test Findings
In this section we discuss our main results with respect 
to the relationship between active management, the 
CIO, endowment size and performance.
Hypothesis A:  
Over time active management results in higher returns 
for endowments.  
Test: We averaged annual endowment returns over the 
entire reporting period of 8 years within each activeness 
bucket.  We then calculated a simple linear regression 
and found the following relationship between average 
returns and activeness:
Return = 5.25 + 2.13 × Activeness
We find that there is a statistically significant positive 
correlation between activeness of the endowments and 
performance.
Fiscal Year 2006 - 2013
Alpha 5.24
Beta 2.13
t Value 2.20
One-sided Confidence 95.0%
Adjusted R^2 13.8%
FIGURE III
U.S. Equity Returns by Degree of Activeness
2006-2013
Source: NACUBO-Commonfund Study of Endowments (NCSE)
Data shows that hypothesis ßactive>0 is accepted at 95 
percent confidence level.  This result confirms that on 
average, endowments with larger allocation to actively 
managed equity funds outperform passive ones over the 
reported period of July 1, 2006 – June 30, 2013. 
It should be noted that despite a positive correlation 
between activeness and overall performance there is a 
significant variability in the endowment returns which 
means there are other factors in addition to activeness 
that could potentially influence performance of the 
endowment.  Regression shows that activeness factor is 
accounting for about 14% of the variability in explaining 
endowment returns.
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Hypothesis B: 
Endowments with in house CIOs are better able to earn 
incremental positive returns from active management 
than those without. Is the existence of a CIO correlated 
with the ability to earn higher returns from active 
management? Is it a signal as to the institutional ability 
of an endowment to identify and invest with high 
performing active managers?
Test: We found that among endowments pursuing an 
active U.S. equity investment strategy, those with a 
dedicated CIO earned on average a return of 7.4% while 
those without a CIO earned 4.1% annually over the 
observation period.  Significance tests for correlation 
between average returns and presence of a dedicated 
CIO for the endowment shows that correlation, while 
being low, is positive and statistically significant at a 
97.5% confidence level.   
Correlation 5.7%
Beta 2.1
F-Stat 8.0
Confidence 97.5%
A similar analysis but for individual years for which 
data is available is shown in the tables below.  Statistical 
tests on correlation show that the presence of a CIO is 
correlated with excess returns in 2010 and 2011.  In both 
years, the average endowment with a CIO outperformed 
S&P 500 index by 3% and 1% respectively. 
Average Return
Year Correlation F-Stat Hypothesis S&P 500 
No 
CIO CIO
2009 -3% 0.5 N/S* -26% -25% -26%
2010 8% 3.2 90% 14% 16% 17%
2011 15% 11.2 99% 31% 30% 32%
2012 2% 0.1 N/S* 5% 2% 2%
2013 5% 0.9 N/S* 18% 21% 21%
* Not significant
FIGURE IV
Distribution of NCSE Respondents with and without CIOs/OCIOs and Degree of Activeness in U.S. Equities
2006-2013
Source: NACUBO-Commonfund Study of Endowments (NCSE)
0 - 20% 21 -40% 41 - 60% 61 - 80% 81 - 100%
Percentage of Activeness
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Hypothesis C:  
Larger endowments are better able to earn incremental 
positive returns from active management than smaller 
endowments.  
Next, we analyzed data by the size of the endowment; 
we divided endowments into 3 size buckets: 
1. Under $100 million 
2. $100 million to $500 million 
3. Over $500 million.  
We see that endowments in the $100-500 million bucket 
show a statistically significant positive correlation to 
activeness for U.S. equity.
Size of Institution >$500 mm $100 - $500 mm < $100 mm
Alpha 9.93 6.10 3.29
Beta -0.53 3.18 3.10
t Value -0.12 1.61 0.86
One-sided Confidence N/S* 90% N/S*
Adjusted R^2 -4% 6% -1%
*Not significant
0 - 20% 21 -40% 41 - 60% 61 - 80% 81 - 100%
Equity Returns (%)
Percentage of Activeness
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FIGURE V
NCSE Respondents: U.S. Equity Returns from Active Management 
2006-2013
Source: NACUBO-Commonfund Study of Endowments (NCSE) 
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Data shows that hypothesis  is accepted at 95% 
confidence level for endowments with $100-500 million 
assets under management, confirming that on average  
larger allocations to actively managed equity funds 
outperformed passive ones over the calendar period of 
1/7/2005 – 6/30/2013. 
Smaller (less than $100 million) and larger (greater 
than $500 million) endowments also show positive 
dependency on actives but not enough to be statistically 
significant. This is partly due to sample size and data 
distribution for various size groups.  As shown on Figure 
VI, blue line, endowments in $100 – 500 mm group are 
relatively evenly distribution across activeness buckets 
and have large sample size of 1,507 data points.  While 
for larger and smaller endowment distribution is more 
irregular and sample sizes are smaller.  Note that larger 
endowments represented by the green line on Figure 
VI, are heavily skewed towards active investing. Smaller 
endowments on the other hand are heavily weighted 
toward both ends of the activeness spectrum as shown 
by the blue line on Figure VI.
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Hypothesis D: 
Active management enhances endowment returns by 
generating greater returns in up markets and smaller 
losses in down markets.
Next we evaluated whether there are any patterns in 
activeness and performance relative to market returns in 
different time periods. We analyzed data averaged across 
all the endowments during fiscal years 2006 to 2013.  
Results show that active management during 2008 and 
2009 added a statistically significant value. Especially for 
2009, significance is very high at a 99 percent confidence 
level. Based on these results, we conclude that active 
management added value in this down-market, and 
acted as downside hedge.
Fiscal 
Year
Factor 
Beta t value
One Sided 
Confidence
Adjusted 
R^2
S&P 
Return
2006 0.09 0.11 N/S* -5% 9%
2007 0.77 1.75 95% 9% 21%
2008 3.21 3.29 99% 30% -13%
2009 1.49 1.59 90% 6% -26%
2010 -0.26 -0.30 N/S* -4% 14%
2011 -1.51 -1.37 90% 3% 31%
2012 -1.78 -2.62 99% 20% 5%
2013 -0.04 -0.06 N/S* -4% 18%
*Not significant
Results show that the relative contribution of active 
management can be either positive or negative during 
up markets. For example, endowments employing active 
management did better in 2007 but did worse in 2011 
and 2012. In 2012, during a year of sideways markets for 
the domestic equity, we see statistically strong indication 
at a 99 percent confidence level that performance of 
active management was suboptimal.
Overall, our results suggest that during individual years, 
active management in U.S. equity may or may not 
add value but that over longer periods of time, active 
management does add value and outperforms passive 
index investing. Outperformance in active investing is a 
long term effect and takes time to materialize.
Section V
Conclusions
We have conducted a longitudinal analysis of the 
NACUBO-Commonfund Study of Endowments 
(NCSE) results from 2006-2013 to evaluate if active 
management is related to higher endowment returns in 
U.S. equities over time. We have also analyzed the data 
to evaluate whether endowment size and the presence or 
a CIO or OCIO are correlated to the returns of active 
management in U.S. Equities. 
We find that active management for endowments is 
significantly positively related to higher returns net of 
fees from U.S. equity allocations over the evaluation 
period. In addition, endowments with CIOs or OCIOs 
are better able to earn incremental positive returns 
from active management than those without. Larger 
endowments are better able to earn incremental positive 
returns from active management than the smallest 
endowments but the effect appears to diminish as 
endowments increase in size.
Over time, active investing can result in excess returns, 
but it requires skill to identify truly active managers that 
beat the market versus closet indexers.  It is easy to make 
a mistake in differentiating a truly active manager from 
closet indexers, and sophisticated performance analysis 
of managers’ returns is essential if one is to capture the 
benefits of active management. Survey data indicates 
that there is a correlation between outperformance and 
use of a CIO. 
To capitalize on the benefits of active management, 
smaller endowments need to have access to the services 
of a skilled evaluator in order to discern true active 
managers from closet indexers. For smaller endowments, 
the overhead costs of such an in house CIO office 
outweigh the benefit. However, benefits of such services 
can be partially or fully obtained via the use of OCIO 
and consulting services. 
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Market Commentary 
Information, opinions, or commentary concerning the financial markets, economic conditions, or other topical subject matter are 
prepared, written, or created prior to posting on this Report and do not reflect current, up-to-date, market or economic conditions. 
Commonfund disclaims any responsibility to update such information, opinions, or commentary. 
To the extent views presented forecast market activity, they may be based on many factors in addition to those explicitly stated in this 
Report. Forecasts of experts inevitably differ. Views attributed to third parties are presented to demonstrate the existence of points of 
view, not as a basis for recommendations or as investment advice. Managers who may or may not subscribe to the views expressed in 
this Report make investment decisions for funds maintained by Commonfund or its affiliates. The views presented in this Report may not 
be relied upon as an indication of trading intent on behalf of any Commonfund fund, or of any Commonfund managers. 
Market and investment views of third parties presented in this Report do not necessarily reflect the views of Commonfund and 
Commonfund disclaims any responsibility to present its views on the subjects covered in statements by third parties.
Statements concerning Commonfund Group’s views of possible future outcomes in any investment asset class or market, or of possible 
future economic developments, are not intended, and should not be construed, as forecasts or predictions of the future investment 
performance of any Commonfund Group fund. Such statements are also not intended as recommendations by any Commonfund Group 
entity or employee to the recipient of the presentation. It is Commonfund Group’s policy that investment recommendations to investors 
must be based on the investment objectives and risk tolerances of each individual investor. All market outlook and similar statements 
are based upon information reasonably available as of the date of this presentation (unless an earlier date is stated with regard to 
particular information), and reasonably believed to be accurate by Commonfund Group. Commonfund Group disclaims any responsibility 
to provide the recipient of this presentation with updated or corrected information. 
